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Abstract 
By analyzing the relationships among chance, 
weight of evidence and degree of belief, we show 
that the assertion ''probability functions are spe­
cial cases of belief functions"' and the assertion 
"Dempster's rule can be used to combine belief 
functions based on distinct bodies of evidence" 
together lead to an inconsistency in Dempster­
Shafer theory. To solve this problem, we must 
reject some fundamental postulates of the the­
ory. We introduce a new approach for uncertainty 
management that shares many intuitive ideas with 
D-S theory, while avoiding this problem. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Evidence theory, or Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory, was de­
veloped as an attempt to generalize probability theory by 
introducing a rule for combining distinct bodies ofevidence 
[Dempster 1967, Shafer 1976]. 
As a formal system, D-S theory is distinguished from other 
uncertainty management approaches by [Dempster 1967, 
Shafer 1976]: 
l. A basic probability assignment, m(z), defined on the 
space of the subsets of competing hypotheses, rather 
than directly on the hypotheses themselves. m( z) 
in turn defines the degree of belief, Bel( A), and the 
degree of plausibility, Pl(A), of a set of hypotheses 
A. Bel( z) is a generalization of a probability function 
q(z). 
2. Dempster's rule of combination, applied to calculate 
mtffimz(z) from m1 (z) and mz(z), where mt(z) and 
mz(z) are based on evidence from distinct sources, 
and m1 ffimz ( z) is based on the pooled evidence. 
In this paper, we argue that there is an inconsistency among 
the fundamental postulates of D-S theory. Though there are 
several possible solutions of this problem within the frame­
work of O-S theory, each of them has serious disadvantages. 
Finally, we briefly introduce a new approach that achieves 
the goals of D-S theory, yet is still natural and consistent. 
2 A SIM PLIFIED SITUATION 
To simplify our discussion, we address only the simplest 
non-trivial frame of discernment 9 = {H, H'} (191 = 1 is 
trivial). Since e is exhaustive and exclusive by definition, 
we have H' == ii (the negation of H). In such a situa­
tion, the basic probability assignment m : 29 __. [0, 1] is 
constrained by 
m(0):::::: 0, m({H}) + m({H}) + m(9):::::: 1. 
Like m, the definitions of Bel and P l are also simplified 
when 191 = 2. With this simplification, we have 
Bel(0) = 0, Pl(0) = 0, 
Bel({H}) = m({H}), Pl({H}) = 1-m({H}), 
Bel({H}) = m({H}), Pl({H}) = 1-m({H}), 
Bel(6) = 1,  Pl(9) = 1. 
As a result, all the information in these functions can be 
represented by an (ordered) pair 
<Bel({H}), Pl({H})> 
which indicates the relationship between the hypothesis H 
and the available evidence. 
Dempster's rule in this case becomes 
mtEElm2({H}) = >.[m!{{H})mz({H}) 
+ mt({H})mz(S) 
+ mt(6)mz({H})] 
m1 EElmz( {ii}) >.[m1 ( {ii} )mz( {ii}) 
+ m1({H})mz(6) 
+ mt(6)7n2({H})] 
m1 EElffl2(9) = >.[m1 (9)mz(6)] (1) 
where 
>. = [1-mt({H})mz({H})- mt({ii})mz({H})]-1. 
When m( { H}) or m( { H}) is equal to 0, there is a special 
case ofbelief functions: a simple support function, in which 
the evidence points precisely and unambiguously to a single 
non-empty subset of 9 [Shafer 1976, page 75]. In this 
situation, the degree of support for {H} (or {H}). •· is 
complete} y determined by the weight, w, of the evidence. 
What is weight of evidence? Though Shafer does not give a 
general method for practically evaluating it, he attaches the 
following properties to it [Shafer 1976, pages 7, 88]: 
1. w is a measurement defined on bodies of evidence, and 
it takes values on [0, oo]. 
2. When two entirely distinct bodies of evidence are com­
bined, the weight of the pooled evidence is the sum of 
the original ones. 
When the simple support functions to be combined each 
provide positive evidence for H, we have 
m,({H}) = ., , m1(6) = 1- .,, 
1n2({H}) = -'2, m,(e) = 1- -'2· 
Then Dempster's rule gives 
m,El)mz({l!}) = 1- (1- -'1)(1- -'2) 
m1 ffim2({H}) = 0 
m1 EBm2(6) = (1- -'1)(1 - -'2) , 
which is the same as Bernoulli's rule of combination 
[Shafer 1976, page 76]. 
Following the postulates that weights of evidence combine 
additively and that Dempster's rule (and its special case, 
Bernoulli's rule) is the correct way to combine them, the 
function g, which maps weight of evidence to degree of 
support, is determined by 
g(w1 + wz) = 1- (1- g(wl))(1- g(wz)). 
The result is [Shafer 1976, page 78]: 
g(w) = 1- e-w. (2) 
This relationship between weight of evidence and degree 
of support can be extended to the situation where the two 
pieces of evidence to be combined are in conflict. That 
is, one of them supports H, whereas the other supports ii. 
Concretely, they are 
m1({H}) = •1, m1(6) = 1- -'1, 
m2({ii}) = -'2• mt(6) = 1- -'2· 
Then Dempster's rule gives 
m1EElm2({H}) 
m, EElmz ( {ii}) 
m1EElmz(6) 
If we rewrite the result of the combination of conflicting 
evidence in terms of weights of evidence, and use w+ and 
w- to indicate the weight of positive and negative evidence 
for H, respectively (their sum is the total weight of evidence, 
w), we get a generalization of (2) [Shafer 1976, page 84]: 
Bel({H}) 
ew+ - 1 
e""+ + e""- - 1 
w+ 
Pl({H}) 
e 
(3) ew+ + ew- - 1 
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On the other hand, we can determine w+ and w- from 
Bel({H}) and Pl({H}) when Bel({H}) < Pl({H}), 
and get [Shafer 1976, page 84] 
+ l Pl({H}) w og Pl({H})- Bel({H}) 
l 1- Bel({H}) w og Pl({H})-Bel({H}) (4) 
The concept of "evidence combination" can be fonnulated 
as 
(5) 
where wt and wi, as well as w} and w2, come from 
distinct sources, and w+ (w-) is the weight of the pooled 
positive (negative) evidence (for H). 
Given (3), (4), and (5), we can derive the combination rule in 
terms of Bel( {H}) and Pl({H}). To simplify the formula, 
letbstand for Bel{{H}),andpfor Pl({H}). Thus, 
b 
p 
b1P2 + bzPl - b1 bz 
1- b,(1- pz)- bz(1- Pt) 
P1P2 
1 -b1(1 - pz) - bz(1 -pl) I 
which is exactly Dempster's rule when ]6] = 2. 
(6) 
The above inferences show that when "evidence combina­
tion" is understood as (5), the combination rule(in thefonns 
of ( 1) or ( 6)) and the functions that relate belief functions to 
weights of evidence (in the forms of (3) or (4)) are mutually 
determined. 
Generally, we have Bel( { H}) + Bel( { ii}) :S: 1. When 
m(E>) is 0, or Bel({H}) :::: Pl({H}), it is a special 
case, where Bel( { H}) + Bel( { ii}) = 1. From (3), it 
is clear that this happens if and only if w goes to infinite. 
In [Dempster 1967], Dempster calls such a belief function 
"sharp," and treats it as "an ordinary probability measure." 
In [Shafer 1976], Shafer calls it "Bayesian;' and writes it 
as Bel00({H}). Shafer also refers to Bel00({H}) as the 
chance, or aleatory probability, of H [Shafer 1976, pages 
16, 33, 201]. 1 
3 A PROBLEM 
From the above descriptions, D-S theory seems to be a 
reasonable extension of probability theory because it intro­
duces a combination rule, and still converges to probability 
theory when Bel( {H}) and Pl( {H}) overlap. 
To see clearly how D-S theory and probability theory are 
related to each other, consider the situation where evidence 
for H is in the form of a sequence of experiment outcomes 
with the following properties: 
1. No single outcome can completely confirm or refute 
H. 
1 In this paper, probability is always used to indicate what 
Shafer calls chance or aleatory probability. 
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2. There are only two possible outcomes: one supports 
H, while the other supports if. 
3. The outcomes are independent and provide distinct 
bodies of evidence. 
In the following, t represents the number of available out­
comes, and t+ is the number of outcomes that support H. 
Obviously, t � t+ � 0. 
There are four fundamental assertions in D-S theory that 
are occepted as postulates: 
Assertion 1. q(H) = limt_,QO ': : the chance of His the 
limit of the proportion of positive outcomes among all 
outcomes [Shafer 1976, pages 9, 202]. 
Assertion l. BeZOC)({H}) = q(H): the chance of H is 
adopted as degree of belief [Shafer 1976, pages 16, 
201]. 
Assertion 3. w+ = wt + w[ and w = wr + W2: evidence 
combination corresponds to the addition of the weights 
of evidence from distinct sources (Shafer 1976, pages 
8, 77]. 
Assertion 4. Dempster's rule is the correct rule for evi-
dence combination [Shafer 1976, pages 6, 57]. 
Though the four assertions are reasonable when taken indi­
vidually, they are inconsistent collectively. To show this, let 
us first study the relationship between chance and weight of 
evidence. 
Because there are only two types of evidence, we can as­
sign two positive real numbers wt and w0 as weights of 
evidence to an outcome supporting H and if, respectively. 
After t outcomes are observed, the weight of available pos­
itive, negative and total evidence (for H) can be calculated 
according to Assertion 3: 
w+ = w+t+ 0 ' 
w- = w0(t-t+), 
w = w+ +w-. 
When t goes to infinity so does w, and vice versa. If t: 
converges to a limit q, then according to Assertion I and 
Assertion 2, Bel( { H}) and Pl( { H}) should also converge 
to q, to become BelQO ( {H} ). 
We can rewrite w+ and w- as functions of t and t+ in 
the relationships between belief function and weight of evi­
dence (3), which is derived from Assertion 3 and Assertion 
4. If we then take the limit of the equation when t (as well 
as w) goes to infinity, we get 
B l ({H}) lim ... + -1 e OC) = VI->ClO ... + 
+
•'"- -1 
= 0.5 ifwtq = w0(1- q) 
{ 0 ifwtq < w0(1- q) 
1 if wt q > w0 (1 -:.9)· 
This means�ifq (the chance of H defined by Assertion 1) 
exists, then, by repeatedly applying Dempster's rule to com­
bine the coming evidence, both Bel({H}) and Pl({H}) 
will converge to a point. However, that point is not q in 
most cases, but 0, 0.5, or 1, indicating qualitatively whether 
there is more positive evidence than negative evidence. This 
result contradicts Assertion 2. 
What does a Bayesian belief function correspond to when 
BelQO({H}) is not in {0, 0.5, 1}? Shafer makes it clear 
that this happens when w- - w+ has a constant limit A 
[Shafer 1976, page 197]. In that case, 
BelQO ( { H}) 
In the current example, this happens when 
lim [w0 (t- t+) - wtt+] = A. 
t->co 
Therefore, though a Bayesian belief function is indeed a 
probability function in the sense that 
Bel({H}) + Bel({H}) = 1, 
it is usually different from the chance of H. Bel00 ( { H}) 
and q(H) are equal only when 
1. q(H) is 0 or 1, or 
2. q(H) is 0.5, and wt = w0. 
This inconsistency is derived from the four assertions alone, 
so it is independent from other controversial issues about 
D-S theory: such as the interpretation of belief function; 
the accurate definition of "distinct" or "independent" bod­
ies of evidence; and the actual measurement of weight of 
evidence. No matter what opinions are accepted on these 
issues, as long as they are held consistently, the previous 
problem remains. For example, the choice of wt and w0 
can only determine which chance value is mapped to the 
degree of belief 0.5 (so all the other values are mapped to 
0 or 1 correspondingly), but cannot change the result that 
chance and Bayesian belief function are usually different. 
This discrepancy also unearths some other inconsistencies 
in D-S theory. For example, Shafer describes chance as "es­
sentially hypothetical rather than empirical," and unreach­
able by collecting (finite) evidence [Shafer 1976, page 202]. 
According to this interpretation, combining the evidence of 
two different Bayesian belief functions becomes invalid or 
nonsense, because they are chances and therefore not sup­
ported by finite empirical evidence. If Belco1 ( { H}) and 
Belco2 ( { H}) are different, then they are two conflicting 
conventions, and applying Dempster's rule to them is un­
justified. If Belco1 ( {H}) and Belt102( {H}) are equal, then 
they are the same convention made from different consider­
ations. In D-S theory, however, they are combined to get a 
different Bayesian belief function, unless they happen to be 
0, 0.5, or 1. Such a result is counter-intuitive [Wilson 1992] 
and inconsistent with Shafer's interpretation of chance. 
There are already many papers on the justification of 
Dempster's rule [Kyburg 1987, Pearl 1988, Smets 1990, 
Dubois and Prade 1991, Yoorbraak 1991, Wilson 1993], 
but few of them addresses the relationships among degree 
of belief, weight of evidence, and probability. Actually 
weight of evidence is seldom mentioned in the litelal:ure 
of D-S theory. It is possible to describe and justify D-S 
theory as a mathematical model without mentioning the 
relationships. Shafer, in his later papers (for example, 
[Shafer and Tversky 1985, Shafer 1990]), tends to relate 
belief functions to reliability of testimony and randomly 
coded message, rather than to weight of evidence. Even so, 
the problem is a/wqys there, because it can be derived from 
the four fundamental assertions, none of which has been 
explicitly rejected. 
4 POSSffiLE SOLUTIONS 
To get a consistent theory, at least one of the four assertions 
must be removed. In the following, let us check all four 
logical possibilities one by one. 
It seems unpopular to reject Assertion 1, and redefine prob­
+ 
ability as lim,.,_ oo t w -I 1 , though this will lead to a 
&"' +cw -
consistent theory. The reason is simple: to use "probabil-
ity" for the limit of the proportion of positive evidence is 
a well accepted convention, and a different usage of the 
concept will cause many confusions. 
How about Assertion 3? In the following, we can see that if 
the addition of weight of evidence, during the combination 
of evidence from distinct sources, is replaced by multipli­
cation, we can also get a consistent theory. 
Let us assume w+ = wtwt and w- = w1w2 when two 
Bayesian belief functions Bel00 1 ( { H}) and Bel002 ( { H}) 
are combined. To simplify the notation, the two functions 
are written as b1 and b2 in the following. Now, if we simply 
use the number of outcomes as weight of evidence, then 
from Assertion 1, Assertion 2, and the new assumption, we 
get 
The last equation is a special case of (6), when b1 = P1 and 
b2 = P2 (for Bayesian belief functions). 
Though we preserve consistency, the result is not intuitively 
appealing. For example, no matter how the weight of evi­
dence is actually measured, the combination of two pieces 
of positive evidence with unit weight (wt = wt = 1) 
will get w+ = 1. That is, evidence is no longer accumu­
lated by combination (w+ may even be less than wt, if 
wi < 1). This is not what we have in mind when talking 
about evidence combination or pooling. 
The rejection of Assertion 2 seems more plausible than 
the previous alternatives. Very few authors actually use 
Bel00 ( { H}) to represent the probability of H. Even in 
Shafer's classic book [Shafer 1976], in which Assertion 2 
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was made or assumed at several places, Beloo ( z) is not 
directly applied to represent statistical evidence. 
However, there is not a consensus in the "Uncertainty in 
AI" community that Bel00(z) and q(z) are different. The 
following phenomena shows this: 
1. The "lower-upper bounds of probability" interpreta­
tion for belief functions is still accepted by some au· 
thors [Fagin and Halpern 1991]. 
2. Some other authors, including Shafer himself, reject 
the above interpretation, but they still refer to a prob­
ability function as a special type (a limit) of a belief 
function [Shafer 1990]. 
3. Though some authors have gone so far to the conclu­
sion that Bayesian belief functions do not generally 
correspond to Bayesian measures of belief, they still 
view a belief function as the lower bound of probability 
[Wilson 1992]. 
Even if everyone agrees that B el00 ( z) and q ( z) are differ­
ent measurements of uncertainty and that all relationships 
between probability theory and D-S theory are cancelled, 
as Smets outlines in the transferable belief model of D-S 
theory [Smets 1990, Smets 1991], there are still problems 
with this model. 
We have shown that, following Assertion 1, Assertion 3, and 
Assertion 4, q(H) not only is different from Bel00({H}), 
but also cannot be properly represented in a belief func­
tion or a basic probability assignment. The proportion of 
positive evidence of H can be derived from Bel( { H}) and 
Pl({H}), when Bel({H}) < Pl({H}), as 
w+ logp -log(p-b) 
-;; = logp + log(1- b)- 2 log(p-b) 
where b is Bel( { H}) and pis Pl( {H} ) . Still, the relation­
ship is not natural, and the ratio usually does not converge 
to the same point with Bel( {H}) and Pl({H}). As a re­
sult, a natural way to represent uncertainty as proportion of 
positive evidence becomes less available in D-S theory. As 
shown before, Bel( { H}) is more sensitive to the difference 
of w+ and w-. than to the proportion ww+. q( z ), as the 
limit of the proportion, even cannot be represented. The 
knowledge "q(H) = 0.51" and "q(H) = 0.99" will both 
be represented as Bel�{H}) = Pl({H}) = 1. and their 
difference will be lost. 
If Assertion 2 were rejected, it would be invalid to interpret 
Bel( {H}) and Pl( { H}) as "lower and upper probability" 
[Dempster 1967, Smets 1991, Fagin and Halpern 1991, 
Dubois and Prade 1992]. It is true that there are probability 
functions P( z) satisfying 
Bel({z}) � P(z) � Pl({z}), for all z E 9. 
However, as demonstrated above, these functions may be 
unrelated to q(H). 
2Here we do not distinguish ",.+ and *: , because their differ­
ence does not influence the conclusion, as shown previously. 
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For the same reason, the assertion that "the Bayesian theory 
is a limiting case of D-S theory" [Shafer 1976, page 32] 
may be misleading. From a mathematical point of view, 
this assertion is true. since Bel00 ( { H}) is a probability 
function. But as discussed previously, it is not the proba­
bility of H. Therefore, it is not valid to get inference rules 
for D-S theory by extending Bayes theorem. In general, 
the relationship between D-S theory and probability theory 
will be very loose. 
It is still possible to put different possible probability dis­
tributions into e and to assign belief function to them, 
as Shafer did [Shafer 1976, Shafer 1982]. For example, 
the knowledge "q(H) = 0.51" can be represented as 
"Bel({q(H) = 0.51}) = 1." However, here the proba­
bility function is evaluated by the belief function, rather 
than being a special case of it. The two are at different 
levels. As a result, the initial idea of D-S theory (to gener­
alize probability theory), no longer holds. From a practical 
point of view, this approach is not appealing, neither. For 
instance, for any evidence combination to occur there must 
be finite possible probabilities for H at the very beginning. 
It is unclear how to get them. 
Finally, it is unlikely, though not completely impossible, to 
save D-S theory by rejecting Assertion 4. We can say that 
Dempster's rule does not apply to evidence combination, 
but can be used for some other purposes. Even so, the 
initial goal of D-S theory will be missed. 
In summary, though it is possible for D-S theory to survive 
the inconsistency by removing one of the assertions, the 
result is still unsatisfactory. Either the natural meaning of 
''probability" or "evidence combination" must be changed, 
or the theory will fail to meet its original purpose, that 
is, to extend probability theory by introdudng an evidence 
combination rule. 
5 AN ALTERN ATIVE APPROACH 
In spite of the problems, some intuitions behind D-S theory 
are still attractive, such as the first three assertions, the idea 
of lower-upper probabilities [Dempster 1967], and the dis­
tinction between disbelief and lack of belief [Shafer 1976]. 
From previous discussion, we have seen that the core of 
evidence combination is the relationships among degree of 
belief, probability, and weight of evidence. The combina­
tion rule can be derived from the relationships. 
Let us continue with ·the previous example. Because all the 
measurements are about H, we will omit it to simplify the 
formulas. Following the practice of statistics, for the current 
example a very natural convention is to use the number of 
outcomes as the weight of evidence: wt = w0 = 1. 
Because our belief about H is totally determined by avail­
able evidence, it may be uncertain due to the existence of 
negative evidence. To measure the relative support that H 
gets from available evidence, the most often used method 
is to take the frequency of positive evidence: f = VI+ • Ac­
cording to Assertion 1, lim,.,-+oo f = q, that is, the limit of 
f, if it exists, is the probability of H. Therefore, we can 
refer to frequency as probability generalized to the situation 
of finite evidence. 
However, when evidence combination is considered, f 
alone cannot capture the uncertainty about H. When new 
evidence is combined with previous evidence, f must be 
reevaluated. If we only know its previous value, we cannot 
determine how much it should be changed - the absolute 
amount of evidence is absent in f. Can we capture this kind 
of information without recording w and w+ directly? 3 
Yes, we can. From the viewpoint of evidence combination, 
the influence of w appears in the stability of a frequence 
evaluation based on it. Let us compare two situations: in 
the first, w = 1000 and w+ = 600, and in the other w = 10 
and w+ = 6. Though in both cases f is 0.6, the stability 
is quite different. After a new outcome is observed, in 
the first situation the new frequency becomes either � or 
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much larger in the second situatlon than in the first. 
If the information about stability is necessary for evidence 
combination, why not directly use intervals like [ 1� 1 fa:h] 
and [ /i 1 fr] to represent the uncertainty in the previous 
situatlons? 
Generally, let us introduce a pair of new measurements: a 
lower frequency, l, and a upper frequency, u, which are 
defined as 
w+ 
w+ 1 
w+ + 1 (7) u = 
w+ 1 · 
The idea behind l and u is simple: if the current frequency 
is VI+, then, after combining the current evidence (whose 
weight is w) with the new evidence provided by a new 
outcome (whose weight is 1), the new frequency will be in 
the interval [11 u] . 4 
As bounds of frequency, land ushare intuitions with Demp­
ster's P. and p•, as well as Shafer's Bel and Pl. However, 
they have some properties that distance them from the func­
tions of D-S theory and other similar ideas like lower and 
upper bounds of probability: 
1. l � f � u, that is, the current frequency is within the 
[l1 u] interval. Furthermore, it is easy to see that f = 
I-�+l' so the frequency value can be easily retrieved 
from the bounds. 
3Though it is possible, in theory, to directly use w and w + as 
measurements of uncertainty, it is often unnatural and inconve­
nient. See [Wang 1993b] for more discussions. 
4We use an interval instead of a pair of points because the 
measurements will be extended to situations in which the weights 
of evidence are not necessarily integers. In general, the interval 
bounds the frequence until the weight of new evidence reaches a 
constant unit For the current purpose, the 1 that appears in the 
definitions of l and u can be substituted by any positive number. 
1 is used here to simplify the discussion. See [Wang 1993b]. 
2. The bounds of frequency are defined in tenns of avail­
able evidence, which is finite. Whether the frequence 
of positive evidence really has a limit does not mat­
ter. On the other hand, the interval can be detennined 
before the next outcome occurs. 
3 .  lim,.,-+co l == limw -oo I = lim,.,_00 U = q. If I 
does have a limit q, then q is also the limit of land 
u. Therefore, probability is a special case of the [l, u] 
interval, in which the interval degenerates into a point. 
4. However, q, if it exists, is not necessarily in the inter­
val all the time that evidence is accumulating. [l, u] 
indicates the range 1 will be from the current time to a 
near future (until the weight of new evidence reaches 
a constant), not an infinite future. Therefore, l and u 
are not bounds of probability. 
5. The width of the interval i == u -l = w�t monoton­
ically decreases during the accumulating of evidence, 
and so can be used to represent the system's "degree 
of ignorance" (about f). When w = 0, i = 1, because 
with no evidence, ignorance reaches its maximum. 
When w--+ oo, i = 0, because with infinite evidence 
the probability is obtained, so the ignorance (about the 
frequency) reaches its minimum, even though the next 
outcome is still uncertain. In this way, "lack of belief' 
and "disbelief' are clearly distinguished. 
From the definitions of the lower-upper frequencies and As­
sertion 3, a combination rule, from [lt, ut] x [h, u2] to [l, u], 
is uniquely determined in tenns of lower-upper frequencies, 
when neither it = u1 - lt nor i2 = u2 - 12 is 0: 
= 
u 
lJi2 +hi! 
il + i2- iJi2 
lti2 +hi;+ iti2 
iJ + i2- iti2 
(8) 
From (3) and (7), we can even set up a one-to-one map­
ping between the Bel-Pl scale and the l-u scale, when the 
weight of evidence w is finite and 181 = 2. In this way, 
the combination rule given by (8) is mapped exactly onto 
Dempster's rule (6) .. From a mathematical point of view, 
the two approaches differ only when w --+ oo. Then Bel 
and Pl converge to a non-trivial (not in {0, 0.5, 1}) prob­
ability if and only if w- - w+ converges to a constant, but l 
and u converge to a non-trivial probability if and only if "'+ 
converges to a constant. The latter, being the probability �f 
H, is more helpful and important in most situations than the 
fonner is. In fact, Shafer acknowledges the problem when 
he writes, "It is difficult to imagine a belief function such as 
B el00 being useful for the representation of actual evidence 
[Shafer 1976, page 199]." · However, the result seems to 
be accepted without further analysis, since it follows from 
Dempster's rule. 
Let us apply the paradigm to infinite evidence. For prac­
tical purpose it is impossible for a system to get infinite 
evidence, but we can use this concept to put definitions and 
conventions into a system. Beliefs supported by infinite 
evidence can be processed as normal ones, but will not be 
changed through evidence combinations. 
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According to the interpretation of the [Z, u] interval, it is not 
difficult to extend the new combination rule (8) to the case 
of infinite evidence: 
1. When i1 = 0 but i2 > 0, the rule is still applicable in 
the fonn of (8), which gives the result that l = 11 = 
u1 = u. Thus when uncertainty is represented by 
probability (a point, instead of an interval), it will not 
be effected by combining its evidence with finite new 
evidence. 
2. When i1 = i2 = 0, the rule cannot be used. Now the 
system will distinguish two cases: 
(a) when l1 = 12 = u1 = u2 there are two identical 
probabilistic judgments, so one of them can be 
removed (because it is redundant), leaving the 
other � the conclusion; or, 
(b) lt -:f. h. meaning there are two conflicting proba­
bilistic judgments. Since such judgments are not 
generated from evidence collection but from con­
ventions or definitions, the two judgments are not 
"combined," but reported to the human/program 
which is responsible for making the conventions. 
Here we are even more faithful to Shafer's interpretation 
of (aleatory) probability than D-S theory is. Being "essen­
tially hypothetical rather than empirical;' probability cannot 
be evaluated with less than infinite evidence [Shafer 1976, 
page 20 1]. For the same reason, it should not be changed 
by less than infinite evidence. 
In summary, though many of the intuitive ideas of D-S 
theory are preserved, the problem in D-S theory discussed 
above no longer exists in the "lower�upper frequency" ap­
proach. The new method can represent probability and 
ignorance, and has a rule for evidence combination. The 
new approach can hardly be referred to as a modification or 
extension ofD-S theory, in part because Dempster's rule is 
not used. 
This approach is used in the Non-Axiomatic Reason­
ing System (NARS) project. As an intelligent reason­
ing system, NARS can adapt to its environment and an­
swer questions with insufficient knowledge and resources 
[Wang 1993a, Wang 1993b]. A complete comparison of 
NARS and D-S theory is beyond the scope of this paper. 
By introducing the approach here, I hope to show that the 
most promising solution for the previous inconsistency is 
to choose a new rule for evidence combination. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Though the criticism of D-S theory to Bayes approach is jus­
tifiable, and the "lower-upper frequency" approach is mo­
tivated by similar theoretical considerations [Wang 1993c], 
the two approaches solve the problem differently. 
D-S theory, though it can be used to accumulate evidence 
from distinct sources, establishes a unnatural relation be­
tween degree of belief and weight of evidence by using 
Dempster's rule for evidence combination. As a result, the 
assertion that ''probability is a special belief function" is in 
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conflict with the definitions of "probability" and "evidence 
combination." 
The inconsistency is solvable within D-S theory, but such a 
solution will make D-S theory either lose its naturalness (by 
using a concept in a unusual way), or miss its original goals 
(by being unabl� to represent probability or to combine 
evidence). 
Though not specially designed to replace D-S theory in gen­
eral, the "lower-upper frequency" approach does suggest a 
better way to represent and process uncertainty. 1be new 
approach sets up a more natural relation among the vari­
ous measurements of uncertainty, including probability. It 
can combine evidence from distinct sources. 1berefore, it 
makes the system capable of carrying out multiple types 
of inference, such as deduction, induction, and abduction 
[Wang 1993a, Wang 1993b]. 
Acknowledgment . 
This work is supported by a research assistantship from 
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana 
University. Thanks to Angela Allen for polishing my En­
glish. I also appreciate the helpful comments of the anony­
mous referees. 
References 
[Dempster 1967] A. Dempster. Upper and lower probabil­
ities induced by a multivalued mapping. Annals of 
Mathematical Statistics, 38:325-339, 1967. 
[Dubois and Prade 1991] D. Dubois and H. Prade. Updat­
ing with belief functions, ordinal conditional functions 
and possibility measures. In P. Bonissone, M. Henrion, 
L. Kanal, and J. Lemmer, editors, Uncertainty in Ar­
tificial/ ntelligence 6, pages 311-329. North-Holland, 
Amsterdam, 1991. 
[Dubois and Prade 1992] D. Dubois and H. Prade. Evi­
dence, knowledge, and belief functions. International 
Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 6:295-319, 1992. 
[Fagin and Halpern 1991] R.Fagin andJ.Halpem. A new 
approach to updating beliefs. In P. Bonissone, M. Hen­
rion, L. Kanal, and J. Lemmer, editors, Uncertainty 
in Artificial Intelligence 6, pages 347-374. North­
Holland, Amsterdam, 1991. 
[Kyburg 1987] H. Kyburg. Bayesian and non-Bayesian ev­
idential updating. Artificial Intelligence, 31:271-293, 
1987. 
[Pearl 1988] J. Pearl. Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent 
Systems. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Mateo, 
California, 1988. 
[Shafer 1976] G. Shafer. A Mathematical Theory of Ev­
idence. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1976. 
[Shafer 1982] G. Shafer. Belief functions and parametric 
models. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series 
8, 44:322-352, 1982. 
[Shafer 1990] G. Shafer. Perspectives on the theory and 
practice of belief functions. International Journal of 
Approximate Reasoning, 4:323-362, 1990. 
[Shafer and Tversky 1985] G. Shafer and A. Tversky. Lan­
guages and designs for probability judgment. Cogni­
tive Science, 12:177-210,1985. 
[Smets 1990] Ph. Smets. The combination of evidence in 
the transferable belief model. IEEE Transactions on 
Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 12:447-
458,1990. 
[Smets 1991] Ph. Smets. The transferable belief model and 
other interpretations of Dempster-Shafer's model. In 
P. Bonissone, M. Henrion, L. Kanal, and J. Lemmer, 
editors, Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 6, pages 
375-383. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1991. 
[Voorbraak 1991] F. Voorbraak. On the justification of 
Dempster's rule of combination. Artificial Intelli­
gence, 48:171-197, 1991. 
[Wang 1993a] P. Wang. Non-axiomatic reasoning system 
(version 22). Technical Report 75, Center for Re­
search on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University, 
Bloomington, Indiana, 1993. 
[Wang l 993b] P. Wang. From inheritance relation to non­
axiomatic logic. Technical Report 84, Center for Re­
search on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University, 
Bloomington, Indiana, 1993. 
[Wang l 993c] P. Wang. Belief revision in probability the­
ory. In Proceedings of the Ninth Conference on Un­
certainty in Artificial Intelligence, pages 519-526. 
Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Mateo, Califor­
nia, 1993. 
[Wilson 1992] N. Wilson. The combination of belief: 
when and how fast? International Journal of Ap­
proximate Reasoning, 6:377-388, 1992. 
[Wilson 1993] N. Wilson. The assumptions behind Demp­
ster's rule. In Proceedings of the Ninth Conference on 
Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pages 527-534. 
Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Mateo, California, 
1993. 
